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Yen! Japan's New Financial Empire and its Threat to America. Daniel
Burstein. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988. 335 pages. Cloth,
$19.95.
Daniel Burstein's flamboyant new book, Yen, 1 makes two fundamen-
tal errors typical of the pop-thinking about Japan that characterizes
much recentjournalism on the subject. First, Burstein compares Japan's
economic performance to that of the United States and concludes that
Japan's success somehow represents a dire threat to America. He could
not be more wrong.
Burstein then describes important aspects ofJapanese culture, par-
ticularly as that culture is reflected in Japanese management techniques,
and concludes that all the U.S. must do to regain its competitive position
vis-a-vis Japan is to copy the Japanese. In offering this unoriginal solu-
tion to what Burstein describes as the Japanese "threat," Burstein man-
ages to demonstrate that his understanding of America is even more
impoverished than his understanding of Japan.
Lurking just below the surface of Burstein's story about Japan is an
undefended abhorrence of the Reagan administration and its free mar-
ket economic philosophy. Burstein attempts to depictJapan as a twenti-
eth century example of a successful centrally planned economy, and
America as the paradigmatic example of the decadent horrors of uncon-
strained capitalism. Were it not for the fact that Burstein's crude gener-
alizations were so broadly shared, it would be tempting to ignore his
unsubstantiated monologue. Nevertheless, recent incidences of Japan-
bashing by Americans, particularly in the 1988 presidential campaign,
and the growing belief that Japan somehow is to blame for America's
trade deficit, suggest that Burstein's unfortunate perspective cannot
simply be ignored.
* Professor of Law, Cornell University.
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Throughout his book, Burstein makes it clear that he does not think
himself an unsophisticated xenophobe or a racist. Indeed, he goes to
some lengths to suggest admiration, if not fondness, for the Japanese
people. Despite an occasional generous remark, however, the picture of
Japan that emerges is that of a monolithic economic monster, populated
by nationalistic automatons, whose every move is aimed at driving
America to its knees and achieving world domination of the financial
markets. By contrast, the U.S. is portrayed as a slovenly giant, paralyzed
by short-sightedness, unproductivity and a chronic lack of leadership.
Fortunately, the reality is far more complicated than Mr. Burstein would
have us believe.
I. The Japanese Economic Miracle as a Threat to U.S. Interests
It is very easy to make the case that Japan is financially successful at the
moment. It is far more difficult to understand why their success should
not be applauded. Put another way, Burstein shifts from a thumbnail
description of Japan's success to the conclusion that the Japanese are to
blame for the economic problems that now confront the United States.
This crucial move is performed by Mr. Burstein with all the dexterity of
a ten year-old amateur magician. Indeed, at the heart of Mr. Burstein's
book is a thinly veiled warning that Japan will convert its economic




After World War II Japan's economy lay in ruins. By 1950, its per capita
income was less than three-fourths of the pre-war level.3 Japan steadily
improved its position, however, and by 1963 was firmly ensconced
among the world's industrialized countries. 4 In terms of the all-impor-
tant indicia of per capita income, measured in terms of purchasing
power parities, Japan has achieved remarkable success. By 1987 its
purchasing power, measured on a per capita basis, was about 91 percent
of the United States's. This places Japan well ahead of Italy and the
United Kingdom, slightly ahead of France, and just below West
Germany.5
Thus, on its face, Japan appears simply to have regained its pre-war
stature as an industrial giant. There is no particular reason to believe
that Japan will come to dominate the world scene. The source of alarm
appears to be the fact that Japan's GNP has been expanding at about
twice the rate of the U.S. Extrapolating from these rates of growth, Her-
man Kahn predicts that the Japanese economy will become as large as
2. See, e.g., id. at 19, 27, 71, 271, 272, 280-81, 284-92.





the U.S. economy by the year 2000.6
Before reaching any conclusions about Japan's economic future,
however, one must have a theory about how Japan has been able to
attain its present level of success in the wake of the massive destruction
of the Second World War. By better understanding Japan's success, we
will be able to assess its prospects for the future.
By far, the best explanation for Japan's economic miracle has been
advanced by Mancur Olson, who, in his path breaking book, The Rise and
Decline of Nations,7 observed that the powerful distributional coalitions
that existed before the war were destroyed during the Allied occupation.
With the destruction of these distributional coalitions came rapid eco-
nomic growth.
Distributional coalitions (also known as interest groups) slow eco-
nomic growth for three reasons. First, they devote resources to redis-
tributing wealth to themselves from society as a whole. These efforts at
wealth redistribution consume real resources, force other people to
waste resources in order to block such wealth transfers, and provide
severe disincentives to investment because potential investors must
worry that some distributional coalition will expropriate any investments
they make. Import tariffs, taxes aimed at wealth redistribution and regu-
lation of the contracting process are all mechanisms by which distribu-
tional coalitions can tranfer wealth to themselves from society at large.8
Second, the proliferation of distributional coalitions staggers the rate of
economic growth by slowing down society's capacity to adopt new tech-
nologies and to reallocate resources in response to changing condi-
tions.9 Third, the growth of distributional coalitions increases the
complexity of regulation, the role of government and the complexity of
understandings, thereby making society less productive, particularly in
the long run.10
After the war, Japan was temporarily freed from the shackles of
these pernicious distributional coalitions, and the economic energy of
the nation was unleashed. Yet, as time goes on, and Japan's distribu-
tional coalitions regain strength, it seems inevitable that its growth rates
will slow as economic energy is diverted from wealth creation towards
wealth transfer.'1
One thing appears certain-Japan's success cannot be attributed to
vague cultural differences between Japan and the United States that
cause the Japanese to work harder. As Olson has observed, while many
people attribute the success of the Japanese to the characteristics of the
Japanese culture or its people, until the mid-nineteenth century, Japan
6. H. KAHN, THE EMERGING JAPANESE SUPERSTATE: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE
(1970).
7. M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982).
8. Id. at 42-46.
9. Id. at 74.
10 Id. at 73.
11. Id. at 76.
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did not distinguish itself as an economic powerhouse. Indeed, "the con-
ventional wisdom among Western observers was far different than it is
today, with some alleging thatJapanese character or culture was intrinsi-
cally incapable of economic development."'
12
The social and political upheaval that led to the Meiji restoration
abolished many of the trade restrictions that had hampered Japan's eco-
nomic growth. As the Meiji government eliminated the barriers to a
national market, Western powers, particularly Britain, restricted the
ability of the Japanese to impose tariffs on imports. 13 The abolition of
these restrictions led to the unprecedented economic growth in Japan of
the 1880s and 1890s.
B. Japan's Success as a Threat to the United States
Perhaps the most perplexing aspect of Mr. Burstein's approach to the
Japanese phenomenon is its failure to articulate why Japan's success
poses such a threat to the United States. At times, Burstein suggests
that every dollar gained by a Japanese means a dollar lost by an Ameri-
can. In particular, when Burstein describes the recent success of Japa-
nese financial intermediaries such as Sumitomo Bank or Nomura
Securites, he implies that the growth of these firms has meant not only
the "enrichment ofJapan" but also "the erosion of American economic
strength."14
Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that Japanese economic
success comes at the expense of American wealth. Indeed, the better
argument appears to be that the opposite is true. As Japanese firms pro-
duce better products at lower prices, American consumers benefit.
American firms and American workers compete with the Japanese, just
as they compete with one another. Contrary to Burstein's assertions,
however, the game is not zero sum. The competitive process leads to
innovation, to lower production costs and, ultimately, to an increase in
wealth.
Burstein implies, for example, that the U.S. suffered as a result of
the stiff competition in the automobile industry in the 1970s. Brustein
describes the scenario as one in which jobs were lost, profits were nar-
rowed and opportunities for growth lost. 15 Nothing could be further
from the truth. Consumers clearly profited from the global rivalry, and
ultimately, American automobile companies were forced to produce far
better products at lower prices due to the healthy influence ofJapanese
competition. Thus, competition from Japanese producers should be
viewed as a healthy, albeit painful, aspect of modern life. The global
economic competition of the 1980s is not a zero sum game. These com-
petitive pressures lower prices, improve the quality of productive output
and ultimately enrich the lives of American consumers.
12. Id. at 151.
13. Id. at 152-53.
14. D. BURSTEIN, supra note 1, at 258.
15. Id.
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The analogy that Burstein seeks to draw between Japanese competi-
tion in the automotive industry and Japanese competition in the finan-
cial services sector is appropriate in only one respect. In the United
States, both the automotive industry and the financial services industry
have been characterized by high barriers to entry, stodgy management
techniques and poor product performance. By contrast, their Japanese
rivals faced stiff domestic competition before venturing out into the
global markets. It was, therefore, unsurprising that the Japanese met
with early success. Eventually, however, American automotive firms,
particularly Ford, began to compete more effectively with the Japanese.
All consumers, but particularly American consumers, benefitted by this
competition.
It is worth emphasizing that in areas such as home appliances and
computer software, where U.S. firms have faced stiff domestic competi-
tion for a number of years prior to entry by the Japanese, the Japanese
did not come to dominate international competition. Indeed, a clear
pattern emerges. The Japanese consistently have been able to locate
areas of economic activity in which high concentration ratios have led to
high profit margins. Mr. Burstein's depiction of the Eurobond market
fits this model perfectly. 16 In order to succeed in this market, firms must
have a lot of reputational capital because international credibility is
important to market participants. This need for reputational capital
allowed a small number of western firms to dominate the market and
garner sizeable returns at low risk. Beginning in the mid-1980s, how-
ever, the large Japanese investment banks, particularly Nomura, Daiwa,
Yamaichi, Nikko, and the Industrial Bank of Japan, entered the market
and eventually came to dominate it. They did this by cutting spreads.
As Burstein concedes, "(t]raditionally high margins have become wafer
thin."
17
Burstein's view that these events harm U.S. interests is patently
incorrect. Now, when U.S. firms go to the Eurobond market to raise
funds, they can do so at lower rates of interest. The new, lower rates
enable these firms to fund more activities more cheaply. The result is
higher employment and lower product prices, as firms' cost of capital
declines. Thus, the intense competition that came with the arrival of the
Japanese to the Eurobond market directly benefits U.S. interests. It was
the old, quasi-cartelized system that harmed U.S. interests.
Thus, Burstein's argument that Japan's economic success comes at
the expense of America's economic interests is simply wrong because it
is based on the erroneous premise that economic success is a zero sum
game. The success of Japanese firms in global competition benefits
American consumers by providing consumers with better quality prod-
ucts at lower prices. The same is true of Japan's success in the world
capital markets. Increased competition in the supply of capital will
16. Id. at 241.
17. Id.
. - - - m - " , - , '. - -, L, =,Q4L,
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lower the cost of capital and result in lower interest rates. Lower inter-
est rates bring significant economic benefits such as higher wage levels
and lower housing costs.
Burstein also suggests that Americans will be harmed if the Japa-
nese become so successful that the U.S. is displaced as the economic
capital of the free world. It is unclear why this should be the case. Per-
haps we derive some sort of "psychic income" from being the most
important player in world financial affairs. The U.S., however, has only
itself to blame for losing its place as the major player in the world finan-
cial markets. Our financial system is hampered by a panoply of populist-
based laws and regulations that impede the growth of our financial serv-
ices firms. These laws include the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibits
the same firm from performing both commercial and investment bank-
ing services; the Bank Holding Company Act, which bars most corpora-
tions from owning banks; the Change in Bank Control Act and the Bank
Merger Act, which impede the market for corporate control of banks;
and the Douglas Amendment to the McFadden Act, which impedes
interstate banking. These restrictions prevent U.S. finanical services
firms from achieving the size and scope of Japanese firms.
As even Burstein recognizes, by the year 2000 the world "will be
dominated by a small group of mega-financial institutions."'18 None of
these mega-financial institutions is American. All ten of the world's
largest banks in terms of deposits are Japanese, and the largestJapanese
securities firm, Nomura, is larger than the top twenty American securi-
ties firms combined. It is twenty times the size of the largest U.S. securi-
ties firm, Merrill Lynch. The point should be obvious: it is not the
Japanese who are somehow depriving U.S. investment banks of a domi-
nant position in the world of finance, but rather, it is U.S. laws that pre-
vent the financial services industry from attaining a sufficient capital
base to compete effectively in global markets.
In fact, the U.S. should welcome the entry of Japanese competitors
into global capital markets. As information technologies develop, it is
inevitable and desirable that individual nations will sacrifice their ability
to single-handedly influence world affairs. This decline in the ability of
sovereign powers to influence events will lead to greatly enhanced indi-
vidual freedom and human rights. It will also signal the emergence of a
single, globalized financial marketplace.
It is unlikely that a single country, be it the United States or Japan,
will dominate this market in the long run. Furthermore, as the world
becomes more interdependent, we appear to be witnessing the
decoupling of economic power and military power. Japan is the first
non-military superpower. After 1992 Europe will probably emerge as
the second. The U.S. and the Soviet Union will be important partici-
pants in world markets only to the extent that they can offer quality
products at competitive prices.
18. Id. at 237.
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Perhaps the most revolting, and certainly the most erroneous, of
Burstein's reasons for bemoaning Japanese domination of the securities
markets is contained in a portion of the book subtitled "Money Without
Morals." 19 In this chapter, Burstein manages to infer that the Japanese
are less moral in their business dealings than are Americans. The fact is
that foreign aid by all countries, particularly the United States, is done at
least in part to further national goals. Much of the foreign aid expendi-
tures of the United States are justified on the basis of furthering the
nation's long-term strategic interests. Aid to Latin America and Israel,
which comprises the bulk of U.S. foreign aid expenditures, is justified
explicitly in these terms. For Burstein to single out Japan and attempt
to distinguish it from the U.S. by underscoring Japanese efforts to fur-
ther its own interests through foreign aid policies is simply outrageous.
It is also misleading. Japan spends a larger portion of its GNP on for-
eign aid than does the U.S., and according to James Fallows, is about to
surpass the U.S. in total foreign aid.
20
Moreover, to claim, as Burstein does, that the Japanese lack the
"impulse to global charity" 2 ' is simply erroneous. In fact, Japan has a
well deserved reputation for generosity in foreign aid, particularly
among other Asian countries. Burstein, however, even manages to fault
Japan for concentrating its charitable giving among its neighbors.
2 2
More recently, however, at the five power economic summit in Toronto
in the summer of 1988, Japan proposed a bold and generous new Latin
American debt plan, sending a clear signal that the Japanese recognize
their global responsibilities and are prepared to fulfill them.
II. What Lessons Should Americans Learn from the Japanese?
Burstein warns that unless America changes:
Like postwar Europeans, twenty-first century Americans will have to come
to grips with a world that is no longer theirs-a world in which U.S. cur-
rency, institutions, corporations, and culture are no longer defacto inter-
national standards. True, the U.S. economy is inherently too diverse, its
market too large, and its military superiority too far ahead for American
power to evaporate as rapidly as Britain's did after World War II. But at
least Britain had the luxury of declining into an American-dominated
order with which it shared both a cultural affinity and a special political
relationship. In the twenty-first century, the United States faces the possi-
bility of declining into a fiercely competitive and potentially hostile Japa-
nese- and Pacific-influenced world order.
23
Yet the changes Burstein has in mind would make America's position in
the world economic order even more precarious. Burstein does not
appear to have learned the lesson that virtually every world leader from
19. Id. at 250.
20. Fallows, Containing Japan, THE ATLANTIC, May 1989, at 40, 46.
21. D. BURSTEIN, supra note 1, at 251.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 294.
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Mikhail Gorbachev to Margaret Thatcher has found so fundamental:
market forces are superior to central planning as a means for allocating
societal resources. Thus, Burstein rejects the most fundamental lesson
of the post-war period. In place of an economic system in which market
forces allocate societal resources, Burstein advocates a quasi-socialist
system in which we achieve a Japanese-style consensus about resource
allocation.
Burstein says that the American consensus "must" reflect "some
general level of agreement about what constitutes the public interest
and the public good." 24 He goes on to bemoan the "shift toward per-
sonal wealth as the chief motivating factor in American life," calling it
"antithetical to national prosperity as a whole."'2 5 In place of the profit
motive, Burstein would substitute the tired old socialist idea that
resources should be allocated on the basis of an as-yet-undefined
"industrial policy" dictated by an unnamed leadership, presumably act-
ing on the basis of "national consensus."' 26 Burstein, of course, cannot
define the "public interest." Therefore, he cannot tell us anything
about what this national consensus would look like.
There are three flaws with Burstein's approach to America's eco-
nomic crisis. First, as the world becomes more competitive, placing con-
fidence in the ability of a single country to respond to rapidly changing
economic conditions on the basis of central planning is simply farcical.
Central planning has never been an effective mechanism for allocating
resources, and its appeal becomes weaker as the world becomes more
complex. Central planners are simply unable to obtain and assimilate
information as effectively as the price mechanism of the marketplace.
Thus, Burstein's suggestion that the U.S. replace its present commit-
ment to market ordering with a new reliance on the central planning
required by industrial policy is a recipe for disaster.
Second, Burstein argues that the American entrepreneurial spirit
was an innovation of the Reagan years and had not been a part of the
American scene before the 1980s. In making this assertion, Burstein
manages to ignore two hundred years of American history. Indeed,
until Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, a laissezfaire economic philosophy
which manifested itself in the form of substantive due process, had, for
better or for worse, been considered an implicit component of American
constitutional law. In fact, entrepreneurialism is an important part of
American culture. Central planning has long met with suspicion. Bur-
stein is simply wrong to blame America's current woes on a policy of
laissez-faire.
Third, in a nation as diverse and heterogeneous as the U.S., individ-
ual initiative has been given a high premium because the diversity that
characterizes this country makes consensus unlikely except in times of
24. Id. at 296.




grave national crises. Thus, while the Japanese succeed by working
from consensus, Americans' greatest successes will continue to be made
by mavericks, who, striking out on their own in pursuit of profit, have
enriched themselves, and mankind as well. The notion that you can sim-
ply transport a cultural system that builds upon consensus to a country
as ethnically and culturally diverse as the U.S. is ludicrous. Similarly,
Burstein's admonition that "our values must undergo change" 2 7 cannot
be achieved so long as we remain a strongly pluralistic nation.
In other words, the U.S. has no choice but to work from its natural
endowment, which includes an ethnically and culturally diverse popula-
tion with a high proportion of individualists. Japan is not a diverse
nation. Consequently, Japan has a far greater ability to work from con-
sensus, but does not share the United States's capacity to benefit from
the contributions of rugged individualists.
Burstein argues that "election-year cycles, partisan politics, and
combative, contradictory special-interest groups must be held in abey-
ance." 28 Burstein is, of course, correct in assuming that special interest
groups have been harmful to the economic well-being of the United
States. Nevertheless, he ignores two important facts. First, he ignores
that the special interest group problem is not unique to the United
States. In recent times Japan, with its powerful agricultural interests,
construction industry coalitions and other interest groups, has suffered
from the problem of factions just as much as the United States. Domes-
tic problems in Japan such as high food and housing costs are, at least in
part, attributable to interest group wealth transfer activity. Japan had a
short-run advantage over the U.S. because the instability of the post-war
period destroyed many special interest groups in Japan and reduced the
power of others. The U.S., however, probably has a long run advantage
over the Japanese in dealing with the interest group problem because,
unlike Japan, the U.S. Constitution is designed specifically to mitigate
the efficacy of such groups.29 Such interest group-based problems as
election finance and corruption of elected officials are an even larger
problem in Japan than in the United States.
Another mistake Burstein makes regarding the problem of interest
groups is his failure to recognize that his plan to replace free trade poli-
cies with industrial policy will inevitably lead to more, rather than less,
partisan politics. Indeed, a shift to a widespread industrial policy will
open the door to a whole new era of interest group domination of the
political process. Industrial policy will be used to provide the public
interest patina on a whole panoply of interest group-oriented wealth
transfers. For example, import quotas have been justified on the ground
that they allow infant industries to obtain stability before being buffetted
by the rigors of international competition. The post-warJapanese expe-
27. Id.
28. Id. at 296.
29. See generally Macey, Transaction Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice
Model: An Application to Constitutional Theoiy, 74 VA. L. REv. 471 (1988).
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rience, however, shows that industries protected from competitive pres-
sure do worse, not better, in the international arena than industries that
face such competition. Similarly, politically powerful industries attempt
to justify wealth transfers to themselves from other sectors of the econ-
omy on the specious grounds that somehow the industrial policy of the
United States should favor such industries. In the absence of market
forces to guide the allocation of capital, however, the quest for funding
becomes purely political. Interest groups are bound to become domi-
nant players in such a scenario.
Thus, allocating resources according to a national industrial policy
instead of according to supply and demand conditions dictated by the
market will dramatically raise the payoffs available to interest groups
who engage in wealth transfer activity. These new, higher stakes will
provide greater incentives for interest groups to engage in partisan
political struggle for wealth transfers.
Conclusion
Japan's post-war emergence as an economic superpower should be
viewed as entirely beneficial to the United States from virtually every
perspective. Japan's productivity has been unambigously beneficial to
the American consumer. Not only have Americans been able to
purchase a variety of well-made products at competitive prices, butJapa-
nese competition eventually forced the stodgy American steel and auto-
motive industries to become competitive. In other words, Japanese
competition forced American industry to awaken to the fact that global
competition is inevitable.
Even if the Japanese had never become an economic superpower,
the U.S. would face stiff international competition from a newly united
Europe in 1992, from increasingly sophisticated Korean producers and
ultimately from Eastern bloc countries that are gradually being freed
from the shackles of central planning. Thus, the Japanese are only the
first in what probably will be a continuous wave of important new com-
petitors on the world economic scene.
In this new multi-polar economic environment, both Japan and the
United States will play important roles. It is highly unlikely, however,
that any nation will completely dominate the world scene as the U.S. did
immediately after World War II. Most important, we must recognize
that the Japanese have attained their success within the constraints
imposed by economic reality. They are a very homogeneous people
who live on crowded islands. Americans are an extremely diverse peo-
ple spread out on a relatively large land mass. These constraints will
shape the way that Americans and Japanese respond to the competitive
pressures of the future. The only real threat to the continued friendship
and cooperation of the two countries comes from people like Daniel
Burstein who advocate making America "competitive" by choking off
world markets, and by imposing central planning on American indus-
VoL 22
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tries. These policies would harm domestic consumers and undermine
the stability of the world economic order. In other words, the danger to
America from Japan's post-war success is that it provokes pop thinkers
like Daniel Burstein to propose such dangerous "remedies."

BOOK REVIEW
Clyde D. Stoltenberg *
Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the Lead. Clyde V.
Prestowitz. New York: Basic Books. 365 pages.
Early on in his book, Trading Places: How We Allowed Japan to Take the
Lead,' Clyde Prestowitz refers to the offer made by Fujitsu Corporation
(Japan's leading computer manufacturer) on October 24, 1986, to buy
the Fairchild Semiconductor Company.2 Fujitsu withdrew its offer after
both Secretary of Commerce Baldridge and Secretary of Defense Wein-
berger opposed it "on the grounds that the United States was becoming
too dependent on Japan for critical technology." Commenting on the
event, Prestowitz observes:
In 1981, the secretaries of commerce and defense would not have
noticed-let alone objected to-Fujitsu's bid for Fairchild. Now they did.
In 1981, the United States, although less dominant than previously, was
still the world leader in industry, technology and finance as well as in
military power. In 1987, it was the leader only in military power, and
even there was facing the necessity of reducing commitments. In other
areas, the United States, which had played the role first of occupier and
then of protector and mentor, had traded places with its former pro-
tege-Japan. 3
Thus he sets the stage for his skillful analysis of how the Japanese have
done what they've done and how, wittingly and unwittingly, we have
helped them.
Prestowitz is particularly well qualified to address the issues
involved. Since 1964, when he first spent time in Japan as a graduate
student, his considerable skills and intellect have focused on that coun-
try's development, as a businessman living in Japan and competing for
market share, as Counselor for Japan Affairs to the U.S. Secretary of
Commerce from 1981 to 1986, and now as Senior Associate at the Car-
negie Endowment in Washington, D.C. He observes in the introduction
to the book that "today, a little over forty years after the end of the
Second World War, Japan and the United States are again being drawn
into increasingly rancorous confrontations reminiscent of the past,
stemming from the same misunderstandings, and carrying some of the
* Executive Director, East Asia Business Program, University of Michigan
1. C. PRESTOWITZ, TRADING PLAcEs: How WE ALLOWED JAPAN To TAKE THE
LEAD (1988).
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id. at 7.
22 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 635 (1989)
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same dangers."'4 His self-expressed purpose in writing the book is to
"make some small contribution to a better understanding and to avoid-
ing further friction between the two countries." 5 Whether the book suc-
ceeds in its larger purpose of avoiding friction remains to be seen and
will depend on how many leaders in policy-making positions on both
sides of the Pacific heed its lessons. In its lesser purpose of increasing
understanding, the book succeeds admirably.
Characterizing the U.S. businessman of the past forty years as "the
cowboy of the world marketplace," and the Japanese as "more like our
early settlers,"6 Prestowitz argues that "the crux of the situation is that
the United States and Japan have fundamentally different understand-
ings of the purposes and workings of a national economy."'7 The prob-
lem is not essentially one of poor American management or laziness;
8
rather, it is the failure to recognize that "management, good or bad, is
not an isolated phenomenon but operates in the context of a particular
nation." If only we had a better understanding of these fundamental
differences in outlook,' 0 Prestowitz suggests, we would be able to see
more easily why "few, if any, American companies can compete with the
Japanese in the areas the latter deem important.""l
Prestowitz describes precisely how this has already happened across
4. Id. at xiv.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 14. Although Prestowitz skillfully uses this analogy throughout the
book to illustrate contrasting approaches between the two countries, he is not the
first to adopt it. See, e.g., Sato, Government-Business Relationships in the United States and
Japan, in STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 15 (R. Tung ed. 1986) [hereinafter STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT]:
Let me briefly compare our two nations: The United States is the ultimate
frontier country. Of all the great nations, it is the one with the greatest mar-
gin of safety for experiment, whether for economic opportunity or for polit-
ical self-government. Secure between two oceans, the United States is a vast
land mass abundant in natural resources; however, it has always needed to
import human resources. Now turn to Japan. It is a bleak offshore archipel-
ago that, ever since it set out to be more than a subsistence economy, has had
to devote much of its talents merely to buy the most basic raw materials from
abroad.
7. C. PRESTowrrz, supra note 1, at 13.
8. "[P]inning all the blame for poor U.S. performance on business management
is simplistic at best and demagogic at worst." Id. at 190. IfJapanese management
were so superior to American management, why would Japan's bankruptcy rate be
"twice as high as that in the United States?" See Pucik, Management Practices and Busi-
ness Strategy in Manufacturing Firms, in STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, supra note 6, at 116.
9. C. PRESTOWrrz, supra note 1, at 13.
10. The social and industrial structure ofJapan has made it an extremely diffi-
cult market to penetrate; furthermore, the Japanese government views indus-
trial performance as akin to national security and pours enormous energy
into ensuring that its industry is the world leader. By comparison, the United
States has been relatively easy to penetrate. Its open society makes for an
open market that has welcomed foreign goods and foreign businessmen.
Most important, however, the United States does not view industry as a mat-





a variety of industries; 12 and points to others in which the process could
easily be repeated. 13 There may, however, be other explanations for the
results in the case of particular products.1 4 We might fault Prestowitz
for emphasizing the damaging impact ofJapanese practices on American
competitors at the expense of downplaying the cost of those practices to
the Japanese. 15 And there might be explanations for the behavior of
American companies in particular instances beyond those Prestowitz
provides. 16 Overall, however, the case Prestowitz makes for his position
12. Prestowitz illustrates the phenomenon in greatest detail with an entire chap-
ter, Chapter 2, devoted to describing how the U.S. semiconductor industry most
recently lost its ability to compete with the Japanese in commercial markets. Id. at
26-70. He includes briefer descriptions of how the same thing had happened earlier
in the case of televisions, id. at 200-06; VCRs, id. at 206; machine tools, id. at 218-29;
and hydrogenerators, id. at 234.
13. E.g., the aircraft industry, id. at 240-41.
14. Gary Saxonhouse argues, for example, that the decline in demand for the
products of the American machine tool industry which occurred in the early 1980s
"owes more to the sharp cyclical downturn of the American economy and the techno-
logical obsolescence of certain of its products than it does to import competition."
Saxonhouse, The National Security Clause of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962: Import Compe-
tition and the Machine Tool Industry, in LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECON-
OMY: AMERICAN AND JAPANESE PERSPECTIvES 234 (G. Saxonhouse & K. Yamamura
eds. 1986) [hereinafter LAW AND TRADE ISSUES].
15. Kozo Yamamura andJan Vandenberg point out that althoughijapan's policies
promoting vigorous economic growth and export expansion in the television indus-
try may have been extremely successful by all quantitative evidence, they were "far
from cost free." They assert that "at least in the case of the consumer electronics
industry, the costs imposed on Japanese consumers were higher, perhaps substan-
tially higher, than those justified in the name of achieving rapid economic growth."
Yamamura & Vandenberg, Japan's Rapid-Growth Polity on Trial: The Television Case, in
LAW AND TRADE ISSUES, supra note 14, at 268.
16. In the case of aircraft, for example, Prestowitz characterizes Boeing's decision
to engage in ajoint venture with severalJapanese companies for development of the
next generation airliner as an undesirable alternative to Boeing's developing the
plane itself but perhaps the only viable response to Europe's subsidization of the
airbus. C. PRESTowrrz, supra note 1, at 240. He portrays the situation as "the ulti-
mate irony of the Japanese government subsidizing an American industry upon which
our own government has turned its back." Id. A Boeing representative, however,
has explained in some detail how the elements ofJapan's targeted industry approach
do not really pertain in the case of commercial aircraft:
A first requirement is a large domestic market. In Japan's case, the domestic
market for commercial aircraft is very small. They represent about 5 percent
of the world market, and that is not big enough to support a large production
volume. Consequently, they cannot first build an industry through a pro-
tected home market. A second requirement is the potential for large-volume
production.... [T~he aircraft industry is typified by low-volume production.
A third requirement is significant potential for innovations to the production
process. The potential for this in the aircraft industry is somewhat limited
due to restricted volume and the cyclical nature of the industry. A fourth
requirement is orientation toward technology exploitation rather than tech-
nology development. The Japanese fare reasonably well on this criterion
since they are oriented toward both. A fifth requirement is limited market
risk and low volatility. This requirement is not met, as discussed earlier. A
sixth requirement is employment stability. The lifetime employment practice
of Japan does not fit the large swings in employment characteristic of the
industry. A seventh requirement is a related military base. This is important
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is convincing.
Is the case hopeless then? No, not if we educate ourselves to the
structures the Japanese have put in place to achieve the stunning results
of the past couple decades so that we can better deal with them. Part II
of the book is a useful effort in providing us with that information. Enti-
tled "What Makes Japan Run," it includes discussion of the Japanese
sense of difference and the perception gap that it creates for our rela-
tionship,' 7 the structure and nature of the Japanese bureaucracy, 18 the
tools of Japan's industrial policy,19 and a general description of Japa-
nese business practices. 20 While other sources, scholarly and popular,
have already appeared covering each of these areas in greater detail,2 1
and while some of the specific points he makes may be open to debate,
2 2
Prestowitz gives us considerable value based on the experiences he had
and the insights he developed as a U.S. policy-maker during the period
in Japan; hence there is a good/fair fit here. An eighth requirement is ade-
quate resources for multiproduct capability. At present Japan does not have
the aerospace capability to produce a family of commercial aircraft models.
The combined aerospace employment of the majorJapanese aerospace firms
that are potential producers of commercial aircraft is about one-tenth that of
Boeing. Therefore, it will be some time before this criterion is satisfied.
The preceding rationale explains why we are willing to take the risk of col-
laborating with Japan-because commercial aircraft does not fit the pattern
of their targeted industry approach. It is a very different type of business
from those in Japan that achieved preeminence through the targeted industry
approach.
Bacher, Strategic Management in Manufacturing: The Case of Aircrafts, in STRATEGIC MAN-
AGEMENT, supra note 6, at 91, 94.
17. C. PRESTOWrrz, supra note 1, at 73-99 (ch. 3).
18. Id. at 100-21 (ch. 4).
19. Id. at 122-50 (ch. 5).
20. Id. at 151-84 (ch. 6).
21. Some of the more notable examples includeJ. ABEGGLEN & G. STALK, KAiSHA:
THEJAPANESE CORPORATION (1985) and C.JOHNSON, MmT AND THEJAPANESE MIRACLE
(1982). A notable example of a book-length study of an industry covered by
Prestowitz in lesser detail is D. OKIMOTO, COMPETITIVE EDGE: THE SEMICONDUCTOR
INDUSTRY IN THE U.S. AND JAPAN (1984).
22. For example, Prestowitz emphasizes how the high level of company debt in
Japan has lowered the cost of capital and enabled companies to leverage investment
rates to potentially three times the rate of earnings growth. C. PRESTOWITZ, supra
note 1, at 168-71. Experts generally agree on the existence of the phenomenon and
its impact. See, e.g., Davidson, A Comparative Analysis of Corporate Capital Structure in the
United States and Japan, in STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, supra note 6, at 146:
Low-cost capital permits Japanese firms to pursue long term, capital intensive
strategies not available to their U.S. counterparts. This factor, rooted in the
Japanese capital markets, provides Japanese industry with its greatest com-
petitive advantage.
However, emerging trends may change the picture. See Isoda, Japanese Corporate
Finance and Corporate Capital Structure, in STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, supra note 6, at 155,
165:
[S]ince the 1973-1974 oil crisis two major trends in Japanese financing
emerged. One, the shift from bank borrowings to capital market financing,
with a concomitant move from bonds issued with mortgages to unsecured
bonds. Two, an emphasis on equity financing rather than debt.... In light
of... changes in capital structure, it should not be long before nonoperating
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he describes. Especially important are his analyses of bureaucratic
power,23 procedure as power,24 promotion of new industries,
2 5 and
restructuring of mature industries.
26
Of course, studying what has created Japan's success is only half the
story. We must also examine our own side of the formula. This
Prestowitz does in Part III, captioned, "What Makes America Wind
Down." He addresses the same problems we have all heard about so
often lately: the flight of U.S. technology, 2 7 short-term profit prevailing
over long-term growth,28 declines in quality and productivity,
29 and the
"isolation of U.S. business," i.e., the lack of identity which Prestowitz
sees our press, consumers and government as having with American
business.30 Again, what makes the discussion valuable is Prestowitz's
past connection with both the companies and the government during
the period under consideration. His intimate knowledge of the players
or financial profit will play as important a role as operating profit in Japanese
corporate financial management.
23. C. PRESTowrrz, supra note 1, at 115-18.
Some U.S. observers of Japan attempt to downplay the power of today's
bureaucrats.... Such arguments are misleading because of the tendency to
equate diminution of power with loss of power. In particular, there is an
obtuse tendency to interpret Japan in terms of the United States and to
assume that if there is no overt legal basis for power, it does not exist. To
accept this fallacy is vastly to overemphasize the actual loss of power and to
ignore the subtle, nonlegalistic nature of Japanese society.
Id. at 115.
24. Id at 118-21. The result of the system which has evolved is that "ministries
write the laws, then write the interpretive ordinances, administer the laws, and han-
dle most complaints arising from them." Id. at 119.
25. Id. at 130-38. Prestowitz's analysis of the many toolsJapanese ministries have
at their disposal at the policy-execution stage is particularly revealing when he dem-
onstrates how they have been applied in the areas of optical fibers, supercomputers
and aircraft.
26. Id. at 140-44.
The combination of Japan's industry promotion policies and the peculiar
nature of its companies ... tends ultimately to create the problem of excess
production capacity, which in turn leads to what the Japanese call "excessive
competition" involving severe price cutting and financial losses .... To
restrain excessive competition, Japan has developed an elaborate set of tools,
providing for the establishment of legal cartels under which companies may
engage in such collaborative activity as joint restrictions on production and
joint reductions in capacity. Administration of these measures involves
extremely close cooperation between industry and government and gives
officials even greater power than does industry promotion.
Id. at 140-41.
27. Id. at 206-08.
28. Id. at 208-11.
29. Id. at 211-13.
30. Id. at 213-16. Referring to the competition between American states to pro-
cure Japanese reverse investment, Prestowitz observes:
[I]nJapan MITI coordinates the policies of the various provinces to prevent
them from bidding against one another for foreign investment. In the United
States, it's everyone for himself. There seems to be no concept that we all
might be better off if we supported each other. And so U.S. business feels
isolated and vulnerable.
Id. at 214.
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in U.S. trade negotiations 3 ' and the course of U.S.-Japan trade negotia-
tions during 1981-198732 have led him to conclude that the United
States confronts a serious conflict between its economic and its national
security.
3 3
Having laid out his views of why Japan has succeeded while Ameri-
can fortunes have declined, Prestowitz concludes with an assessment of
the current situation and prescriptions for future action by both the
United States 34 and Japan3 5 in Part IV, "A Look to the Future." His
recommendations are very much in line with those advanced in studies
also published in 1988 by other leading think tanks and the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee, 36 which are in turn compatible with arguments and
proposals which some of our leading academics have made in recent
years for adoption of a rational, competitive industrial policy by the
United States.
37
All of these studies, steeped in bureaucratic regulation theory and
to a lesser extent market regulation theory, have recently been chal-
lenged to some extent by David Friedman, who asserts that mainstream
scholarship has misunderstood the basis of the Japanese miracle; his
study, based on the machine tool industry, argues that Japan's success is
instead the result of the dramatic expansion of small manufacturers,
constant product innovation (which Friedman claims is more important
than efficiency gains), and the rapid, flexible responses of specialty firms
to changing market opportunities.3 8 In other words, he does not write
off the cowboy to quite the extent Prestowitz seems to have done in his
embrace of the settler. Perhaps there is room, and a need, for both.
Whatever the ultimate outcome of the contest between cowboy and
settler, Trading Places also has a number of things to say to lawyers and
their clients who deal with our system of trade law, to the bureaucracy
which administers it, and to the combination of executive and legislative
authority which generates it. To a lawyer, the book's contributions in
31. Id. at 250-71 (ch. 9).
32. Id. at 272-302 (ch. 10).
33. Prestowitz uses the machine tool industry case to illustrate the impact of this
conflict. Id. at 217-49 (ch. 8).
34. Cut the U.S. budget deficit and increase savings, stop blaming everything on
the incompetence and greed of our business executives, and coordinate policies
affecting industrial production in such a way as to recognize that micro-and
macro-economic policies are inextricably intertwined. Id. at 314-29.
35. Carry out land reform, adopt pro-consumer policies, become an international
market in regard to both trade and investment, and bear more of the cost of main-
taining the free-world system. Id. at 329-32.
36. B. BALASSA & M. NOLAND, JAPAN IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 177-89 (1988); E.
LINCOLN, JAPAN-FACING ECONOMIC MATURITY 267-90 (1988); STAFF OF JOINT Eco-
NOMIC COMMITTEE, 100TH CONG., 2D SESS., RESTORING INTERNATIONAL BALANCE:
JAPAN'S TRADE AND INVESTMENT PATTERNS, 37-56 (Comm. Print 1988).
37. E.g., I. MAGAZINER & R. REICH, MINDING AMERICA'S BUSINESS-THE DECLINE
AND RISE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1982); E. VOGEL, COMEBACK-BUILDING THE
RESURGENCE OF AMERICAN BUSINESS (1985).
38. D. FRIEDMAN, THE MISUNDERSTOOD MIRACLE: INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND
POLITICAL CHANGE IN JAPAN (1988).
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this connection are every bit as important as its broader policy perspec-
tives. It is important because it demonstrates the impact of our trade
law structure in the context of the U.S.-Japan relationship. Peter
Ehrenhaft has often complained that "we really don't know what the
effect of our trade laws is, and we have been afraid to find out."3 9 The
several recent studies looking at the impact of our trade laws in the con-
text of a particular bilateral relationship do indeed reveal that their
effect has often not been that intended.40 Prestowitz addresses the issue
in the U.S.-Japan context with respect to both particular trade law reme-
dies and broader structural and procedural issues. The crux of his argu-
ment is that the problems are structural and therefore require structural
solutions,4 1 and his analysis of particular trade law remedies demon-
strates some of their inadequecies in the U.S.-Japan context.
In the area of dumping, Prestowitz observes in the semiconductor
case that "Japan's industrial structure and competitive dynamics made
dumping inevitable," 4 2 and, more generally, that "[t]he combination of
Japan's industry promotion policies and the peculiar nature of its com-
panies ... tends ultimately to create the problem of excess production
capacity, which in turn leads to what the Japanese call 'excessive compe-
tition' involving severe price cutting."43 Even if a Japanese manufac-
turer loses a dumping case brought against it, as a business decision the
strategy to dump for purposes of gaining market share might make
sense.4 4 U.S. antidumping laws also impose heavy burdens on the pri-
vate domestic companies which are usually the petitioners by imposing
on them the burden of proving both that dumping is taking place and
39. Symposium-American Trade Policy: Actors, Issues, Options, YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 15
(Special Issue, No. 1, 1988) [hereinafter Symposium].
40. See A. RUGMAN & A. ANDERSON, ADMINISTERED PROTECTION IN AMERICA
(1987) (U.S.-Canada); J. WHEELER & P. WOOD, BEYOND RECRIMINATION: PERSPEC-
TIVES ON U.S.-TAIWAN TRADE TENSIONS (1987); D. YOFFIE, POWER AND PROTECTION-
ISM: STRATEGIES OF THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES (1983).
41. Witness his analysis of the hurdles U.S. semiconductor manufacturers con-
front in trying to increase sales to a significant share of the Japanese market:
The problem was much more subtle than tariffs and other formal trade barri-
ers, which had largely been removed. It arose from several factors: the tight
ties between Japan's manufacturers and their suppliers and distributors,
which entail social obligations that go far beyond contractual dealings; the
interlocking relations between major companies which enable them to ignore
Western-style financial discipline; and the fact that, having long been
encouraged by its government to displace foreign products, Japanese indus-
try now did so as a kind of reflex action. In a word, the problem was struc-
tural. The whole industry was structured so as to reject, more or less
automatically, penetration by outsiders or newcomers. Clearly, standard
measures such as lower tariffs and simpler import procedures would not
change this situation.
PRESTOWITZ, supra note 1. at 50-51.
42. Id. at 58.
43. Id. at 140; see also id. at 180-81.
44. Id. at 238-39.
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that it has caused severe injury.45 Actual calculation of dumping mar-
gins is complex and dependent on interpreting data supplied by the
defendants. 4 6 Japanese companies responding to dumping complaints
"can always count on assistance from Japanese government officials,"
while our own "government does not advise its companies in such cir-
cumstances." 4 7 Essentially, Prestowitz characterizes antidumping law as
being effective only to the extent its invocation can provide leverage for
negotiating broader agreements getting at some of the underlying struc-
tural inequities.'18
With respect to countervailing duty law, Prestowitz suggests that
"the American focus on specific subsidy amounts and specific govern-
ment intervention causes misperception."' 49 Moreover, the manner pre-
scribed for calculating countervailing duties overlooks the fact that "a
quite small subsidy can have a powerful effect." 50
Prestowitz does not limit his criticism to statutes aimed at specific
unfair subsidies and predatory pricing activities. He also takes aim at
Section 301, a law which "theoretically gives a president power to do
almost anything he wants in response to acts of a foreign government
that are 'unreasonable, unwarranted, or unjustified,' and that thereby
burden U.S. commerce." 5 1 Although such legislation would appear to
be a powerful club, Prestowitz points out several reasons for which pres-
idents are reluctant to use it.5 2 He points out similar constraints on the
application of Section 232, which enables a president to extend protec-
tion to critical industries if their ability to supply national defense needs
45.
The concepts of injury do not include recognition of the experience curve or
of the fact that a company may be injured by a loss of market share even if it
is growing in absolute terms. Thus, only actual financial losses, closure of
factories, and layoffs of workers count as injury.... The procedure is costly
and time consuming, and the penalty is not retroactive to the time dumping
first occurred, but only to when it is first officially investigated. The result is
that dumping is not inhibited.
Id. at 237-38.
46. Id. at 204-05.
47. Id. at 261.
48. Id. at 61. For some of the same reasons, as well as on grounds of economic
efficiency, some knowledgeable commentators have been sympathetic to the notion
of abandoning our administrative method of assessing antidumping duties and sub-
stituting for it a private damage action. Ehrenhaft, in Symposium, supra note 39, at 17;
Horlick, id. at 45.
49. C. PREsTowrrz, supra note I, at 131.
50.
[The remedy is to calculate the amount of subsidy, divide that by the number
of units produced to arrive at a subsidy per unit, and apply a countervailing
duty of that amount to offset the advantage the subsidy gives the foreign
product when the product is imported. Such a calculation often produces a
ridiculous figure that has no meaning.
Id. at 237. Others have criticized countervailing duty law on somewhat different
grounds. E.g., Tarullo, Beyond Normalcy in the Regulation of International Trade, 100
HARv. L. REv. 547, 552-79 (1987).
51. C. PRESTOWIrz, supra note 1, at 239.
52. Id. at 239.
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is likely to be impaired by imports.5 3
As important as these limitations on the application of specific U.S.
trade law remedies may be, they are subordinate to the fundamental
concern Prestowitz has with structural issues. He does not criticize the
United States for having adopted a legalistic, judicialized approach to
regulating imports "to a degree unmatched by other nations."'5 4 He
does not criticize the United States for training lawyers while Japan
trains engineers; indeed, he emphasizes the fact that the MITI officials
who worked to enact the Extraordinary Measures Law for Promotion of
the Electronics Industry "were trained in law, not engineering; and their
tools were pens rather than micrometers."
'55
Rather, he focuses on the impact which the fundamentally different
economic doctrines embraced by the U.S. and Japan have had on the
two countries' law and policy. He sees American law and policy as
rooted in Western economic doctrine of Adam Smith and David
Ricardo, which "understands greater consumption to be the purpose of
economic activity" and "holds that what nations produce is based on
their resource endowment."'5 6 Modern Japan, on the other hand,
adopted an alternate view of capitalist economic dynamics advanced by
the Austrian economist, Joseph Schumpeter, in which "what matters is
not price competition or resource endowment but the competition aris-
ing from new technology, new sources of supply, and new types of
organization." 5 7 Thus, to the United States, "all industries have
roughly the same economic and strategic value," while to the Japanese,
"some industries are more important than others."5 8
It would be unrealistic to expect eitherJapan or the United States to
abruptly change course, inasmuch as economic doctrine cannot be
divorced from cultural proclivities. It may be that both countries'
courses of action will have to be modified and tempered to accommo-
date the limitations our physical environment may increasingly impose
on any type of growth-oriented economic doctrine. In any event, incre-
mental change appears to be occurring. As one knowledgeable com-
mentator recently observed,
I think that the United States government is finally starting to focus on
the question of what policies make sense, not only for the producing
53. Id. at 242-46.
54. Koh, in Symposium, supra note 39, at 7.
55. C. PREsTOwrrz, supra note 1, at 33. As Glen Fukushima of the U.S. Trade
Representative's Office has noted,
despite the common wisdom that Japan is a "nonlitigious" society compared
to the United States, law is important in Japan. Indeed, many Japanese gov-
ernment bureaucrats and business leaders have been trained in law, think like
lawyers, and base their decisions on laws, ordinances, and regulations. Thus
a knowledge of the application-as opposed to the theory-ofJapanese law is
essential to understand the parameters of economic activity.
Fukushima, Book Review, 47J. ASIAN STUD. 898 (1988).
56. C. PRESTOWrrZ, supra note 1, at 127.
57. Id. at 127-28.
58. Id.
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industries, but for the consuming interest, and for the world trading sys-
tem as a whole. It may be, however, that the only way that you can create
a sensible trading system is to deny access to our market now and again as
a tool for getting other governments to recognize that certain policies of
theirs may not be in the overall world economic interest.59
There are risks in going too far in adopting any such course of action.
The better we understand the context in which the response to such
action will be formulated, however, the wiser our approach should be.
Trading Places makes a significant contribution to enriching our knowl-
edge for purposes of avoiding miscalculation.
59. Stein, in Symposium, supra note 39, at 42.
